Games with imperfectly observable commitment by Damme, E.E.C. van & Hurkens, J.P.M.
~ ~ï~~ Discussion









by Eric van Damme ~,~C~ ~`~ ,~ ~ ~, ~~J
and Sjaak Hurkens ,
.Auaust I994
---------...~.-.,.-.. ~~~~~~~.~.~. , .f ~ ~~ ~~~!fC~T~-~E~~~
ISSN 0924-7E15 G TiLBI,~PG
~Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment
Eric van Damrnef Sj~ak Hurkens`
July 1994
Abstract
In a recent paper, Kyle liagwell claimed that the power to commit onesel( to an
arliun durs not confer any strategic benefit if this commitment can only bo observed
impr~rfor l.l,y. In this paper we show t.hat the validit,y o( this claim depeuds crucially
un thr~ rentrictiun t.o pure strategy equi~ibria. speeificauy, the game analyse~d by
liaKwcll always has a mixed equilibriurn that is rlosc to thc Stackelberg eyuilibriurn
of the game in which the commitment is observed perfectly. We introduce a new
theory of equilibrium selection that combines elements from the theory of Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) with elements from the theory of Harsanyi (1993). When the
noise is sufficiently small, this theory selects the Stackelberg equilibriurn.
'C;entER Cor Economic Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Nether-
lands. '1'he research of Sjaak Hurkens was sponsored by the Foundation for the Promotion oC Research
in F;conrrrnic Sciences, which is part of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).1
1 Introduction
One of Lhe mosL important insights in game theory is that the power Lo cornmit oneself
may cunG~r a s1.raLegic advanLage: iL may be beneficial to constrain une's own behavior
in ordc~r to induce others Lo behave in a way thaL is favorable Lo oneselL One possibilit.y
t.o cornrnit oneself is to rnove early: to preempL Lhc others by choosing and cornmuni-
cating the (irreversible) acLion Lhat one takes before the rivals take their actions. This
idea dates back at least to Von Stackelberg (1934) who dernonstrated Lhe existence oC
a"firsL-mover advantage" in a quantity-setting duopoly. Schellíng's (1960) classic The
Slrnlcyy oJ Confiict generalized Von Stackelberg's initial insight in several dimensions
by desc.ribing richer commitment Lactics as well as illustrating the ubiyuity of the phe-
nornonon t.hat. in independent decision situations weakncss confers strength, that power
may n~tiulL from t hc~ powcr Lo bind oncsclf.
Sche~lling already pointed out. that for a comrnitment to an action to be credible, the
commiLrnenL rnust be irreversible, at least renegiug should be sufficiently aistly. Schelling
also st.ressed that. Lhe ef}icacy of commitment depends on the communication structure
of the game. If the opponent is unavailable for messages, or can destroy all communi-
cation channels before any communication takes p}ace, being able Lo cornmit oneself is
of no value. Hence, comrnitment can be beneficial only if the communication channel is
sufficiently reliable. .lust how irnportant this latter requirement is has be.r.n shown in a
recent. paper by Kyle Hagwell (1992). 13agwell shows that a precise comrrwnicatiou uf
Lhe cornrnit.rrmnt is imporLant, that it is vital that there are no ambiguities, that therc
arr nu niisunderstandings abouL the action to which Lhe player comniil.t.ed hirnsclf. In
fact, liagwell claims that the }irst-mover advantage is completely elimiuaLed when thcre~
is even a slight amount of noise associated with the observation of the first-movers ac-
tion. Specifically, he shows that, if there is some noise, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
outcorne of the game in which one of the players can commit must be a Nash equilibriurn
outcome o( the game in which this commitment possibility is absent. 'I'his is a counter-
intuil.ivc and striking result. and it suggests that a reconsideration of the literature thatapplics t hc~ idea of a"firsL-rnovcr advanLage" rnighl, pcrhaps bc reYkuired.
'I'he intuition for Bagwell's result can be easily conveyed. Let g-(Ai, Az, ur, u2) be a
`l-person norrnal form game and consider the sequential move game wit.h player 1 moving
firsL. However, assurne that player 2 is only imperfectly informed about this commit-
ment. Specifically, if playe.r 1 commits to ar E Ar, player 2 receives the signal a~ E Ar
with probability p(a~ ~ ar) ~ 0 where p(ar ~ ar) ti I. Hence, player 2 is almost perfectly
inforn,ed about the commiLrnenL. 'I'he crucial observation, however, is that if player I
commit.s Lo the pure action ai, the signal that player 2 receives is uninformative. Since
all infortnaLion set.s of player 2 are reached with positivc probability, 13aycs' rule dictates
Lhat 2 bclieves that 1 played a~ no matter what signal 6c rcccives. In cyuilibrium, playc~r
2 be~tiL responds to a~ for all possible messages, hence, if 2's best response Lo a~ in q is
uniquc (say iL is a2), then 'L will respond with a2 no rnatter what rnessage he receives.
Ilowr~ver, then, in order to have an eyuilibrium in the sequential move game, ai should
be a best, response against a2 in g, hence, (a„a2) must be an equilíbrium of g.
As Lhe above paragraph has shown, Bagwell's result is driven by the specific type of
imperfection in the communication technology that he assumes. It is not the case that
the cornrnit,rnent sometimes is not communicated, it is rather that the opponent with a
small probability reccives the wrong message. 'fo puL it differently, Bagwcll's is a modcl
oC errors in perception, rather Lhan errors in cornmunication. Ilis resulL depends on Lhe
assurnption thaL if, for exarnple, a seller commits hirnself to "I do not scll for a price less
t,han ~100", Lhe buyer might interpret this as "I do not sell for less t,han ~10,000~ or as
a cornrnil,tnent to "I give 1.he obje,ct away for freen. We do not wanL to enter into the,
debaLe about whether this is a sensible assumption, although we believe that Lhis specific
assumption might explain why Bagwell's result appears counterintuitive at first. It is,
however, irnport,ant to note that. the assumption is crucial for the resulL. I( communica-
Lion crrors would take Lhe forrn as suggested b,y Schclling (i.e. cornmitrnents worild not.
necessarily be cornrnunicaLod Lo Lhe second rnover, but if they would be cotnmunicated,
they would be communicated without error), then there would not be a lack of robust-3
ness of Lhe type that Bagwell notes. The reader can easily verify that, in Lhe latter case,
as long as t.he probability that the commitment is mceived is sufficicntly high, a player
will comrnit himseJf to his Stackelberg strategy. (Se~ Chakravorti and Spiegel (1993)).
As we do not, wish to clairn that ScheJling's tnodclling of the errors is necessarily bet.-
ter than f;agwell's, we take Bagwell's claim seriously. However, does the theorem that
Bagwcll provcs jnst.ify t.he cJaim that he rnakf~s'? I)ocs the result that t,he pure equilib-
riurn ouLcomes o( the noisy seyuential move ganx~ coincide with the pure equilibrium
outcornes of the simnJtancous rnove game really allow us to concludc t.hat. "with even Lhc
slightest dcgrer, of imperfect.ion in Lhe observability of the first mover's sclection (...) thc
strategic benefit of commitmenL is totally lostn (Bagwell (1992))? In our opinion such a
c-uncl~ision would be prolrlaLllre as it would be based on Lhe assumpl,ion Lhat only purc
st.ratcgy tiash cyuilibria of a game should bc t.akcri into considerat.ion. 'I'hc restriction
Lo purc cquilibria, howcvcr, is not compclling and Lhc game thcwry IiLcraLurc has offercd
no jusl.ificaLion for this resLriction so far. In facl., thc concepL of pure strategy Nash
equilihrium su(fcrs from the important and well-known drawback of [ailing to generate a
solution Cor some games. (J:xistence might be considered the most fundamental property
that a solution concept should satisfy.)
In this paper we take the position that there is no a priori reason to discriminate
against cyuilibria that are not in pure strategics. Consequently, wc have to take rnixed
sLratc,~;Y c~quilibria int.o acrount, and this raiscs t.ha yucstion of which outcomcs can hc
oht.ainccl by mixcrl cyuilibria of Lhc seyucntial movc garnc with irnpcrfecLly obscrvabli~
conunitmcnl.. Wc show Lhat Ilagwcll's noisy gamc has a"noisy SLackclbcrg cx{uilibriurn",
i.e. a mixcd eyuilibriurn that generates an outcome that is close to the Stackelberg ouL-
come and that converges to it as the noise vanishes. Furthermore, we show that there
may bc other equilibria as well. Hence, Bagwell's game raises the issue of equilibrium
selection: If the leader's cornmitment can only be imperfectly observed, will players coor-
dinat.c on a pure equilibriunr of the simultaneous rnove game (and, if thcy do, on which
one?) or will thfy coordinate on the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium? We addr~s this4
issue in SecLion 4. We argue that, starting from an original situation in which there is
uncert,ainty about which strategies will be played, players will reason thernselves to the
noisy St,ackelberg equilibrium. The argument in this section is motivated by elements
from the eyuilibrium selection theories of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and from Harsanyi
(1993), but the theory that we develop is different from each of these. As we show in Sec-
tion ~i, neithcr the theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), nor the thcory from Harsanyi
(1993) selecl,s the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium in general. The comparison of these
various thcorics gives intemsting insights in each of t,hem. Hence, alt,hough the main
rnessagc of this paper is that Lhere is no immediate nced to reconsider thc literatum that,
applies the idea of a"first-mover advantagen, the paper may also be read as an exercise
in eyuilibrium selection.
2 The Noisy Commitment Game
f.et .q bc a(finite) 2-person game in strategic form. Since below we will mainly be
intcn.tited in what. happeus when thc players movc acyuentially rather than simulLanc,-
ously, we label the players as L (for leader) and F (for follower). Z(resp. ,7) denotes
the scl, of pure strategies of player L (resp. player F) in g and u;~ (resp. u;~) denot,es
this player's payoff when the strategy pair (i, j) is played. We write Z-~1,..., l}
and ,7 -{ 1, ..., J}. Throughout this paper we assume that g satisfies the following
regularity condit.ionr:
if (i, j) ~( k,l), then u;~ ~ ukr and v;~ ~ vkt (2.1)
'I'his assumption implies that F has a unique best response against each pure strategy
i of !,. This best response will be denoted by 6; and we write
u; - u~b,.
Wit.huut furthcr loss of gencrality we assurnc that5
ur 1 max u;. (2.3)
;~r
Ilencc, in thc scyucntial move garne in which l, movc:s bcfore h' and in which (' is
perfe~cl,ly infonned about the pure action that L has chosen, the uniyue subgarne perfe~c:t
equilibriurn is (l,b) with outcome (l,br). (We use b to denote the strategy of F in this
game that responds to i with b;(i E Z).)
Wc focus our attention on the noisy version of the sequential move game in which
F is only imperfectly informed about which action has been chosen by L. To that end,
let P be a stochastic matrix defined on the state space Z. Hence, P- (p;k);,kET with
P;k ~ 0 and ~kp;k - 1 for all i. The interpretation is that F receives the signal "L
playcd k" with a probability p;k in case G actually plays i. Emphasis will be on the
situation where the noise, i.e. the probability of receiving the "wrong" signal is small
but positive. Writing Po for the identity matrix on Z(i.e. po - 1 for all i) we will
measure the absolute level of the noise by the distance between P and Po and we will
writc
IPI - max{~P;k - P;kI : 2,k E Z}. (2.4)
We will restrict ourselves to the case whete any signal can result from any action, i.e.
p;k ~ 0 tor all á, k E Z. (`l.5)
l~urmally then, we considcr the extensive form game gP given by the following rulcs:
l. playcr L chooses an action i E Z,
2. chance chooses k E Z with probability p;k,
3. playcr F' lcarns k and chooses j E,7,
4. player L receives the payoff u;~ and F receives v;~.s
`I'his game gy is referred to as the noisy commitment game. Note that the messages
(the signals that F receives) are payoff irrelevant. We will denote a(behavioral) strategy
of player l, (resp. F) in gr by s(resp. f) and we write o- (s, f) for a strategy
combination. Hence, s is a probability distribution on Z, s E 0(Z), and j is a map that
assigns a probability distribution on ,7 to each element of Z, i.e. J E 0(,7)Z. We let
si clenote Lhe probability that I. chooses i while fkj is the probability that F chooses j
in respousc Lo the mrssagc k. We write fk - j if fkj - 1 and use sirnilar conventions
throughouL the text. The outcome of the strategy pair a- (s, f) in gv is the probability
dist.ribution zP - XP(a) that o induces on 1 x J. Hence, we have that
i
ZP(Q)ij - Si ~ ~ikfkj
k-1
Note that zv rnay involve nontrivial correlation of the players' actions. Player I,'s
(expected) payo(f in gr' is written as uP(Q) and h's payoff is denoted by vY(a), hence
ur~Ío) - ~(u ~ z~(~)), vr~(a) -~(v ~ i~(o)) ('l.7)
A pair rr -(s, f) is a Nash equilibrium of gY if s is a be,vt reply against f and f is
a best re.ply against s. Note that because of (2.5) there are no unreached information
sets in the (extensive form of the) game gp, hence, any Nash equilibrium is a sequential
cyuilibriurn, and in order for f to be a best response against s, it is ncressary that fk
is a bcst rcwponsc against Lhe posterior beliefs at k induced by s for every rnessage k.
I3y 13aycs' rule, this posterior belief that F associates to i E I after having received the
rnessage~ k is given by
v,s
(l,k - jriksi, ~ i~nk~9n~
r,
so that, for all .v with sk ~ 0
1 it i-k
lirn ~c,k' -
Ivl--o 0 if i~ k7
IIrnc c~, if I,he noise is srnall and F expects L to chuose k with posit.ive probahility, then
he will attach high probability to the event that L, actually played k whe.n he receives
thc~ rncssagc~ "k". Assurnption (2.1) thus implics that I~' will respond to k with bk in this
catic. Lr~rnrna I pruves a slightly stronger staternent.
Lemma 1 . Them exisls e' 7 0 such lhal jor all P with 0 G ~I'~ G E", all strnteyy
combinaf.inns r-(s, f) and a(l i E Z: IJ s; ? ~P~ and f is a best mply against s in
gP, then f; - b;.
Proof. The regularity assumption (2.1) implies that there exists ó G 1 such that for all
i E Z: lf player F' assigns at least probability ó to L playing i in g, then b; is the uniquc
best response of F in g. Let e' be such that (1 t~)-c 1 ó.
Now, let P be such that 0 G ~P~ - e G e' and let s E 0(Z) and i E Z be such that
s; 1 f. '[hen we obtain from (`l.8)
1 p;;s~
- E(1 - 3i) ~ J1ii,Si
- [1 f E(1 - ~`r~)JP~~s;]-r
? (I -f- f)-r
? (1 i- ~)-r
If j is a best reply against. s, then f is necessarily a best reply against the posterior
beliefs p.; for all i. It, hence, follows from the above inequalities, and the choice of E',
that J; - b;. o
3 Equilibria in the Noisy Commitment Game
hor lhe sake of cornpleteness we start by stating (and proving) 13agwcll's main result.
Proposition 1 ~Bagwell ~199dJJ. The set of pum strntegy equilibrium outcomes of g
and g~' coincidr..8
Proof. Assume (i, j) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in g. Then j - b; and if J is
the strategy of F in gP defined by Jk - b;(k E 7), then (i, J) is an equilibrium of g~.
It obviously produces the same outcome as (i, j) does. Assume (i, J) is a pure strategy
Nash equilibriurn in gP. Since trk' - 1 for all k, we must have f~ - 6; for all k. Flence,
i is a best, rcply against b; in y and (i,b;) is an eyuilibrium of g with thc samc outcornc
as (i,J)- o
I'roposil,ion I gives a suf(icient condition for an outcome to be an equilibrium outcorne
of the game qr'. We now give a necessary condit.ion for the case where the noise is small.
Writc~
Jl~- {(i,b;): u; 1 mkxminuk,} (3.1)
for t,he set of Nash equilibriurn outcomes of the game in which playcr l,'s commitment
is perfectly observed by F. (Note Lhat because of (2.l) any Nash outcome has to be
purc.) Wc have that thc Nash c~quilibrium outcorne correspondence, of ,qr' is upper hemi
continuous at f' - po.
Proposition 2 Let zP be an equilibrium outcome of gP. If z - lám~P~yazP ezists, thera
zEIV.
Proof. 'I'he proof follows frorn regularity assurnption (2.1) and Lemma l. Let, e' be ati
iu Lcrnma I aud for I' witli 0 G ~l'~ G e', Ict (.v~', j~') bc an cyuilibriurn of y~' with
outcornc zr'. Assume the lirnit outcome z to exist. If i~ k,sP ~ ~N~ and sk' ~ ~P~,
thcu f,r' - b, and fk' - bk, hencc
12mIP~~ouP(t,fP) - u;, ltmlp~~ouP(k, fP) - uk.
Rut (2.1) itnplies t.hat u; ~ uk, hence that sPSk' - 0 for ~P~ sufl'icienty smalL The contra-y
dict,ion shows thal,, for ~P~ sufficiently srnall there is aL rnosL one i E Z with s;' ) ~P~.
(;onscqw,nt.ly, wc havc that. z-(i,L;) for Lhis parl.icular valnc of á. II, is obvious thal.
Lhe incyualitics in (3.1) rnust be satisfied. [f there would exist k~ i with u; G min~ uk„
then l, would strictly prefer choosing k above choosing i in gr' for sufficicntly srnall ~ P~. o
I'roposition 2 implies that, when the noise is small, any eyuilihriwn outcorne of g~' is
alrnosl, pure. This iu Luru implies LhaL, if y Las only rnixed eyuilibria, the equilibriutn
outcornes of ,q are disjoint from the lirnit equilibrium outcomes of the noisy comrnitment.
garne when thc noise vanishes. 'I'his shows that a result similar to Pmposition 1 cannot,
be proved for a"satisfactory" solution concept, i.e. there does not exist a refinement of
the Nash cyuilibriurn concept t,hat generates a nonernpty set of solutions for every game
for which the eyuilibrium outcomes of Lhe simultaneous move game coincide with those
oi Lhc noisy cornrnil,ment gamc when the noisa vanishes.
It is not true that any Nash equilibrium outcome oí the commitment game with per-
fect observability can bc approximated by Navh eyuilibrium outcornes of games with
slight noise: the Nash equilibrium correspondeuce is not lower hemi continuous. ln the
game of Figure 1, (B,W) is a Nash outcome of the non-noisy game: It is optimal for
G t,o cornrnit Lo R if f~' responds to 7' with G. [lowever, noise forccw l~' Lo choose W in
response to any signal since W is a dominant strategy. Consequently, only (T,W) can
be approximated by eyuilibriurn outcomes of noisy games. (More generally, it follows







ln this paper we take the position that there is no a priori reason to discriminatc
against cquilibria t.hat are not, in pure strategies. Consequently, we havc to take tnixed
strategy cyuilibria into account and Proposition 2 raises the que:rtion of which outcornes
of the base game g can be approximated by equilibrium outcomes of the game gY when
Lhe noise vanishes. Proposition 3 gives part of the answer: If the noise P is small, therc
is always an equilibrium that produces an outcome that is close to ttre Stackelberg out-
come, i.e. that is close to the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome oí the sequential
move garne without noise. We will refer to such an equilibrium as a noisy Stackelberg
eyuilibrium.
Proposition 3. 'I'he game qY has an equilibrium rr~' -(sY, fP) 7ailh an outcome z~'
thal converr~es to (l,br) as ~P~ -i 0.
Proof. Consider Lhe reduced strategic form g~' that results from the strategic [orm of
gP by elinrinating all pure strategies of F that do not prescribe to play br after the
signa] "1". In this reduced game, player L's expected payoff resulting from playing "1"
is approximately ur if the rroise is small, no matter what F plays. Let o~ -(sP, fP)
be an equilibrium of gP. If sP ~ ~P~ for some i ~ 1, then Lemma 1 guarantees that
fP - b; provided that ~P~ G e'. However, in this case L's payoff resulting from "i" is
approximately u;, hence, uP(i, f P) G uP(1, fP), so that player L wants to choose i with
probahility zero. 'I'he contradiction shows tirat, if ~P~ is sufficiently small
G ~P~ for all i~ l. (3.2)
The inequalities (3.2) in turn imply that sP -~ 1 as ~P~ -~ 0, hence, (by Lemma 1)
that at Lhe signal "1~ only br is a best response of player F. This shows that aP is an
equilibrium o[gr' ií ~P~ is small. Obviously, the outcome zP of QP converges to (l,br) as
~ P~--~ 0. o11
We have smn two suHicient conditions for limit e,quilibrium outcomes (Propositions
1 and 3) and one necessary condition (Proposition 2). The necessary condition is not.
sufficienL (Figure 1) and the sufficient conditions are not necessary: Also outcomes that
are not purc Na.gh equilibria, nor Stackelberg eyuilibria of g may be approxirnated. Con-
sicler the game of F~igure `l in which G has M as a dominant strategy, so that (M,C) is
the uniyuc Nash eyuilibrium. The Stackelberg equilíbrium is (T,W). Consider the noisy
commitment game with uniform noise, i.e. p;~ - e if i~ j and p;; - 1- 2e. It is easily
seen that the following strategy combination is an equilibrium of this game: Player G
comrnits to M with probabilit.y i~~ and to B with the remaining probability r~}é ; player
F responds to signals T and !3 with E, after signal M he plays C with probability 4-ire















We will not attempt to describe exactly which outcomes can be obtained as limits of
equilibrium outcomes of the noisy game as the noise tends to zero. Rather we conclude
from the Propositions 1 and 3 that typically there exist multiple limits and, hence, that
there exisls an equilibrium selection problem. We will attempt to addrexs this selection
prublcmi direcl.ly and wc will propose an argurncnt (an equilibriurn scdect.ion theory)
that actually selects a noisy SLackelberg equilibrium. Our theory incorporates elements
from thc, thcory proposed by Ilarsanyi and Sclten (1988) as well as clernents from the
thcory proposed in Harsanyi ( 1993), however, it di(fers frorn these and it may sclect
different outcomes. In particular, neither the theory of Fíarsanyi and Selteu (1988) nor
that of Ilarsanyi ( 1993) need to select a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium. The next section
describc:s our theory and proves the main result of this paper, while Section 5 discusses
the theories of Harsanyi~Selten and Harsanyi.12
4 Equilibrium Selection
'fhe sl,rategY b uf player l.' I,hat prescribes to play thc besL response bk against action
k E Z for any signal k is a(weakly) dominant strategy in the (strategic form of) the
game where G's commiLment is observed perfectly. If Lhere is a slight amount of noise
(i.e. P~ Pn), then 6 is no longer dominant, however, as long as the noise is small, it is
quite likely that 6 is a best response. Specifically, as Lemma 1 has shown, if ~P~ G e'
and sk 1 ~P~ [or all k, then 6 is the unique best response againsL s in g~. To put,
it differently, 6 is a best response to a set of mixed strategies of player L in gP that
converges to the set oí all strategies as ~P~ -~ 0. On the basis of these considerations it
would scrm that G should assign a large (prior) probability to F playing 6 and, hence, he
will bc Lcrnpted to play his Stackelberg leader strategy "I". Ilowever, if P~ Po and br
is not a dorninant strategy in y, then (1,6) is not an equilibrium of g~, so that a theory
thaL tells player L to play "1" and that tells F to play b is self-destroying. The simple
poinl, we rnake in this section is that, if the players' reasoning process corresponds to
the tracing procedure (Harsanyi (1975), Harsanyi and 5elten (1988)), then players will
finally coordinate on a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium if they start from a prior that as-
signs sufficicnt weight to F playing b.
Ttre tracing procedure is a process that gradually adjusts players' plans and expecta-
tions until they are in equilibrium. We only describe the mechanics of this procedure, for
the rnot,ivation and heuristic description of the process we refer to the original sources.
Let a~r -(s", J") be a mixed strategy combinationl iu g~'. We interpret ~" a the playcrs'
prior expectations, hence, a priori player F believes that L will play i with probability
so while l, believes that F will play the pure strategy J with probability fo( f). For
t E[0, 1] consider the strategic form gP~t~'o defined by
uv'c'oa(l,f) - tuP(i,f) f (1 - t)uP(i,Ïo) (4.1)
vP'c'oo(i,f) - tvP(i,.Ï) f (1 - t)vr(so,Í) (4.2)
Ilence, for t- 1 this garne coincides with gP, while for t - 0 we have a trivial garne13
in which each player's payoff depends only on his prior expectations. Write PP(oo) tor
the graph of the equilibrium correspondence, i.e.
1~~(ao) - {(t; s, J) : t E (0, 1], (s, f) is eyuilibrium of gv'`'"o } (4.3)
It can be shown that in nondegenerate cases this graph 1'P(vo) contains a uníque dis-
tinguished curve that connects the unique equilibriurn oí gP'o'vo to an equilibrium (s', f' )
of g~'. (See Schanuel et al. (1991) for details.) The (linear) tracing procedure consists of
following this curve until its endpoint, and the endpoint TP(vo) -(s', f') is called the
lincar trace of ao in gP. The interpretation is that players eventually reason themselves
to the equilibrium TP(oo) if they start from the prior oo. Write zP(a") for the outcome
of this linear trace TP(ao) in yP. We have that this outcome is close to Lhe Stackelberg
outcome (l,bi) of g if ~P~ is small. Formally
Lemma 2 . Ij the priorQO -(so, fo) is such thal fo(b) is su,,~icientlg close to one, lhen
lim~~'~--uz~~(ao) - (1,6,).
Proof. Let fo(b) be large enough such that
u~(:,.f) ~ u~(1,Io),
i.e. if player l.'s commitment is perfectly observed by F, then L strictly preters to play
"1" when h' re~;ponds wit,h jo. Note that the regularity condition (2.1) implies that (4.4)
holds whenever f(b) is suf~iciently close to 1. Condition (4.4) in turn implies that there
exist c 1 0 and t' 1 0 such that
"ln is strictly dominant for L in gP'`'oo if t G t" and ~P~ C e (4.5)
I~'urt hcrmore, by choosing e sufíiciently small we can guarantee that, for all i~ 1:14
if ~P~ G e, then ur'(i,J) G uv(l,J) for all J with J; - b; and j~ - b~ (4.fi)
We will restrict ourselves to stochastic matrices P with
~P~ G t"~21. (4.7)
Finally, with e' as in Lemma 1, we assume that
~P~ G e". (4.8)
Lel. P be such that (4.5) -(4.8) hold and denote by aP~~ -(sP~~, j~'~~) an equilibrium
on the distinguished curve in I'v(ao) that connects the unique equilibrium of g~'o'oo with
'l'f'(a"). Wc clai~n that
s;''` G 1~`ll for all i~ 1 and all t. (4.9)
Assume, to the contrary, that there exist some i~ 1 and t such that sP'` 1 1~2I and
let r be the smallest t for which an equilibrium of this type can be found. Then r 1 t'
in vicw of (4.5). Hence, at l- r, the total probability that F assigns to G playing i in
gr~`~"o is at least t'~2I, so that (4.7), (4.8) and Lemma 1 guarantee that fP'' - b;. At
the same time we have that
.s~'''-I-~.4;'''~1-1~21-1~2) ~P~
i~l -
so t}iat j~'' - 6~ by the same argument. But now (4.5) and (4.6) imply that
tlP'''vo(t fP'') G 1LP'''oo(1 .fP'') e ~ ~15
hence, sP'' - 0. The contradiction shows that (4.9) holds. In particular, we have that
s~~'r ~ 1 ~l, hence jP'r - br in view of l.emma I. Applying Lemma 1 and (4.6) once more
we seK~ that, Lherefore, sP'r G ~P~ for all i ~ l, hence, that
lim sP'r - l.
~P~~o
"I'his completes the proof. O
To complete our argument that players will (or should) coordinate on a noisy Stack-
clberg eyuilibrium, we have Lo give an argument why player l, should attach a high prior
probabilily to l~' playing 6. We will borrow such an idea from I~arsanyi (1993). Harsanyi
proposes that the prior should be based on (should be proportional to) the structural
incenl.ivc that a playcr has to use this strategy and he suggests to measurc this structural
incenl,ive by the size of the stability set.
l~orrnally, Harsanyi procecds as follows. Let g-G Ar, Azi ur, uZ ~ be a 2-person game
and let S; - 0(A;) be player i's set oí mixed strategies. The stability set o( s; E S; is thc
sct ,S~(s;) of all rnixed strategics of player j against which s; is a bcst response. At first il,
seY~rns natural to measure the structural incentives of a pure strategy ~; by the I,ebesguc
rncasurc of .S~(a;), but Hananyi (1993) shows that this de(inition would violatc certain
desirable properties. To circumvent these, Harsanyi first transforms the strategy simplex
S~ by the so-called inversion mapping ~~ and hc then takes the Lebesguc, rneasure of Lhc
transforrnc,d set. Formally, c.~~ is the mapping from the interior of S~ to the interior of
5'~ that maps s~ into s~ defined by
si(ai) - s~r(ai)~ ~ s~ r(a). (4.10)
aEA~
Hencc, lfarsanyi measures the structural incentives of player i to use the pure strategyIs
a, E ~1, hy numbcr p(a;) - a(~i(Si(a~))) whcrc 1 dcuotcs l.cbesguc rncasurc. '[hc prior
pruh.cLility f.haL playe~r j Lhen assigns to i playing a; is proportional to these iuccntive~s,
hcncc,
Pi(a;) - P(a;)~ ~, PÍa). (4.11)
aEA,
In the special case of our noisy commitment game, we have that the stability set of
thc strategy b of player F converges to the entire strategy simplex of player I, as ~P~ -~ 0
and, hence, that the stability set of any other pure strategy converges to a set of ineasure
zero. It follows that the prior of player L, as constructed by using (4.10) and (4.11) puts
almost all wcight. on the stratcgy b of player ~~' when ~P~ is small. }Iencc, from Lemma
'l we can conclude that players will end up in the Stackelberg equilibrium in the limit.
l~onnally, wc havc proved
Proposition 4 . If player.s construcl their prior beliefs by using Harsanyi's (1993) the-
ory ojstruclura! incentivr.s and if they update their priors by using tiee tracing procedurc
oj Harsanyi (l975J to obtain an equilibrium, then, in lhe limit when lhr. noise vanáshes,
they wi(! play thc Stacke[bery equilibrium.
5 Alternative Methods of Equilibrium Selection
5.1 Evolutionary and Eductive Theories
In this sec.tion we show that thc theories proposed in Harsanyi and Seltcn (1988) and in
líarsanyi (1993) do not necessarily select a noisy Stackelberg equilibriurn as the solution
of t.he game with imperfectly observable commitrnent. 'Phe basic reason is that thc.wc
thcories do not r.onsider all eyuilibria of a game to be eligible as solution candidates.
13oth thcories start by eliminating certain Nash equilibria as candidates. Specifically,
equilibria that are considered to have poor stability properties are eliminated. Harsanyi
and Scltcn (1988) first clirninate all primitive equilibria, i.e. equilibria that do not be-
long t.o a primitive formation. A formation is a set of strategy pain thaL is closed with17
respect to t,aking best responses and a formation is said to be prirnitive if it does not
properly contain any other formation. Harsanyi (1993) only considers equilibria that are
both proper (Myerson (1978)) and persistent (Kalai and Samet (1984)) as eligible. For
generic `2-person games every Nash equilibrium is proper and an equilibrium is persistent
if and only if it belongs to a primitive formation.3 Hence, for generic 2-person games,
both theories start from the same set of initial candidates.
'I'he game displayed in Figure 3 may show that Lhe restriction to primitive (persis-
tenl,) equilibria may eliminate any noisy Stackelberg equilibrium. The game gp has thrm
equililrria: one corresponds to F'roposition 1(with outcome (l,l)), another corresponds
to Yroposit,ion 3(with outcome close to (3,3)), and t,here is a third mixed strategy equi-
librium. Actiou B (i.e. the dominant strategy of L in g) is used with positive probability
in all three equilibria and the unique best response of player F against B in gP is to
always respond with E. Consequently, {(B, EE)} is the unique primitive formation in
gY, hence (B, EF,) is the unique persistent equilibrium of this game. Therefore, the the-
orics of Harsanyi~Selten and Harsanyi select the pure equilibrium of g as the solution of








'1'he argument used in the above example can be generalised. If one accepts persis-
tency as a selection criterion, one is led to the conclusion that in any game in which the
le.ader has a dominant strategy, slight noise eliminates the benefits oí thc leader being
ablc to commit himse.lf:
Proposition 5 . If playr.r l, has a dominanl slralr.gy in ,y, lhen ,qr' hns n unique prirn-
itivc jnrrnnlian (rrsp. pcrai:aent relrnct~, viz. lhe singlef.on set in mhicia l, plat~s lhis18
dnnLinanl slralcgy i. and in vahich h responds Tailh b; lo any signal k.
Proof. Lc~t. If - Hr, x llr. hc a pcrsiatcnt rct.ract. (resp. primitivc furrnation) and let j
bo a purr~ titratcgy of playcr l, in I{r,. "1'hen l.' hati a unique bc~st rewponsc against j in
g~', viz. the strategy j with f,; - b, for all k. Hence, j E RF,. The unique best response
of L against. j is to play his dominant strategy i from g, hence i E R~,. Let fk - 6; for
all k. Then the strict equilibrium (i, f) belongs to R. Conscqucntly, if R is primitive
(persistent), then R - {(i,J)}. o
`I'he hatiir. rcason why Harsanyi and Selten elirninate eyuilibria that arc not primitive
is Lhat such cyuilibria rnay havc vcry poor stabilit.y propcrticti (cL Ilarsanyi and Seltcn
(19RH, p. 'l01 ) and tlananyi ( 1993, footnote 12)). Itcx{uiring persistenry favors the sc-
Icc~t.ion uf rquilibria thaL havc sirnilar stabilit.y propcrt.icw as st.rict. equilibria, hcncc, thc
solul.ion thcorics of llarsanyi and Sclten are biased in favor of the sclccLion of pure equi-
libria. flowever, one may very well wonder whether such a bias is just,ified: The stability
property captured by persistency may be relevant in an evolutionary context - where
the garne is repeatedly played by a large population of players who receive feedback
about cvolution of Lhe play during the garne (scx, for exarnple, Hurkens (1994)) - but
it is not clear that it has any relevance in the case where the game is played only once
and players rely exclusively on deductive personal reflection in order to figure out what
to play. At. t.hc sarnc timc, thc LhcYrrics of Ifarsanyi~Scltcn and Ilarsanyi rcly staongly on
arg~nnrnls (suc~h .~ti Lhc t.racin}; prucccluro) Lhal, sc~c~nr Lu hc particularl,y rc~lc~vanl. in this
lattc~r case anel thal, sccm irrclcvanl, in I,hc forrncr. Ilcncc, these t.hcxrrics rnay bc cril,i-
cized for thc fact LhaL Llicy tnix argumcnts Lhat arc rclcvant in an cvolul.iunary contcxt.
wil.h argnment,s that, arc rc,lcvanl. in an cductivr~ c-ontaxl.. In thc following snbtinctions wc,.
return to the purely deductive perspective.19
5.2 Harsanyi's (1993) Theory
In Lhis subscction we show thal., even in Lhe case where t,he Stackclberg cyuilibrium is
a sl.ri~ t cyuilibrium uf y~' and, hcncc, satis(ics all of Ilarsanyi's (1993) cligibility critc-
ria, Ilarsanyi's thcory nc;c;d nol, sclect Lhis Stackclbcrg cyuilibrium. 'I'he rcason is thal.
Ilarsanyi's thcory does not. invoke thr. tracing procedure. liather, Ilarsanyi proposes to
selecL as the solution of thc garne that equilibrium thaL has the highest prior probability.
With the prior probability of a pure strategy as in (4.11), the prior probability of a pure
strategy pair a is simply given by
P(a) - PF(aL)PL(aF)
WW
and iu thc casc whcrc only purc cyuilibria arc cligiblc, Ilarsanyi sclccts that equilibriurn
a' for whirh p(a`) is largest. (At Icast this is thc solut,ion in case Lhc argrnax is uniquc.)
'I'he~ garnc frorn I~igure 4(in which lí is some rcal posit.ive numbe~r) rnay show that this












'l'hc garne q from Lhe Icft panel of h'igurc 4 is a unanimity gamc with Stackelberg
outcorne (`l,l). '1'he pancl on the right displays ( a reduced form of) thc~ game gP where
P involves uniforrn uoise (p;~ - E if i~ j). We have eliminated the strategy EW for
player h' in g~' (i.e. the strategy in which !-' responds to T by 1; and to B by W)
since this is a dominated strategy. Harsanyi indeed suggests to eliminate all dorninated
strategies before computing the players' structural incentives. The garne gP has three
cyuilihria ('I',WW), ( l3,lsl;) and a mixed cyuilibrium. Only thc forrncr two satisfy
}larsanyi's eligibilit.y criteria, hence, to compute the Ilarsanyi solution of Lhe game, we
have to compare the prior probabilitics of these e;quilibria. Note that although player
2(1 - E),1 - E
1 - E,K(1 - E)
0,020
h's prior a5signs almost, all weight to the strategy WE of player F, this prior probability
plays no rolc in this comparison.
Not~~ Lhat the structural incentivFS for player l, to use any of his pure strategies
are indcpendcnt. of K: '1'hcsc incentives only dcpcnd on playcr I,'s own payoff rnatrix.
I~urt.hr~nnore, not,e that bol.h lhe prior of 'I' and Lhe prior of R remain bounded away from
zeru as c tends Lo iero. "I'urning now to Lhe structural incentives of player l~, we noLa
Lhat Lhe~ calculations are simple since, in the 1-dimensional case, the inversion mapping
is mr~asure prescrving. }Ience, the prior probability of a strategy is just the Lebesguc
mcasurc uf thc sl.ability set. o( Lhat stratcgy. SLraight.forward cornput,at.ions show t,hat
peL(WW) - E,(K - KE -{- E)
an(1
P`L(EE) - Ke~(KE ~- I - E),
hence
IE~a PL(EE~~Pi(WW) - K~~
IL followa Lha1,, if lí is su(ficicntly largc
limp`(T,WW) c lirnp`(l1,EE)
clo cjo
and, hc~nce, that llarsanyi's theory selects the equilibrium (B, Eh,') in that case. For
large valucs of K, Ilarsanyi's Lhrory dces not selecL the Stackelberg eyuilibrium.zl
5.3 R.isk Dominance and the Harsanyi~Selten Theory
An essential ingredient in the equilibriurn selection thcxiry from Ilarsanyi and Selten
(19ti8) is the notion of risk dominance. An eyuilibriurn s is said to risk dominate an
oquilibriuni .ti' if the Lracing procedure, when started at a certain (bicentric) prior p(s,.v')
enels up aL the eyuilibrium s. (13elow we describe how this bicentric prior Iras to be com-
puted.) SLarl,ing írom an initial candidate set, llarsanyi and Selten repeatedly eliminate
equilibria t,hat. are either payoff dorninated or risk clorninated until finally only one candi-
date - the solution remains. We have alrcady seen Lhat the Stackclbcrg equilibriunr
need not be.long to the initial candidate set, hence, the Harsanyi~Sclten theory need not
select it. Ilowever, in Section 5.1 we argued that this elimination step is not convincing.
Ilence, t.he yucwtion remains whether the Stackelberg equilibrium can be eliminated by
consiclc~rations of payoff dorninance or risk dorninancc.
Proposition `l irnplies that the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium cannot be payoff dom-
inatcd whcn Lhe noisc is small. Any Nash equilibriurn outcome of Lhc noisy gamc con-
vergcti to a Nash outcome of the gatne in which I,he cornrnitment. is obscrved perfecl,ly
ancl n.mong the lat,t.er the Stackelberg equilibriurn is rnost preferred by player h. Conse-
quenLly, it rernains to acídress the question of whc,ther the Stackc~lberg eyuilibrium can
be risk dominated. We have not been able to resolve the issue in its complete generality,
however, for two important subclasses of games - 2 x 2 games and unanimity games
we can show that. the (noisy) Stackelberg equilibrium risk dorninates any other equilib-
rium of q~' when the noise P is small.
'fo fonnally def'ine the risk dominance relation we have to dc5cribe how the bicentric
prior p(.ti,.ti) should be cornputed aL which to start the tracing proce~elure. }larsanyi
aucl Seh.cn have thc situation in mind where it is comrnon knowlcdgc arnong Lhc playcrs
that cit.her s or s' is the solution of Lhe game. b:ach player i will initially assume Lhat
his opponent j alrcady knows which of the two is the solution. Vlaycr i will a,gsign a
subjcct.ivc probabilif.y z, to thc solution bcing s(and, hcncc, to j playing s~) and hc
will assign the complementary probability z,' - 1- z; to j playing .5~. After having2`l
constructed these beliefs, i will play a best response 6;(z;) against z;s~ .} z;s~. Player j
does not know i's beliefs z; and, according to t.he principle of insufficient reason, j will
assutne that z; is rmiformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Hence, j will expect i to
play thc stratcgy
t
n~(s,s') - f b~(~~),t~;. (5.s)
U
'I'hc, rnixed st.rategy oC playc~r i defined by (5.6) clescribes player j's a priori beliefs which
arc usccl tu detcrrnine t.hc risk dominance relat.iun between s and s'.
Refore being .rblr, to state the rnain result of this section, one more definition is needed.
Wc say 1.hat. q -C Z„7, u, v~ is a unanimity ga.rnc if (a) Z-,7, (b) u;~ - v;~ - 0 for all
i~ j, and (c) 71;; ~ 0 and v;; , 0 for all i. We simplify notation by writing u; - u;; and
v; - v;; and recall from (2.3) t,hat ur 1 u; for i~ l. We also write "i" for the strategy
of playc~r h in qh that prescribes to respond t,o any signal k E Z by playing i E Z.
Proposition 6. l,et g br. a unanimity gamc. Then the Stackelberg equálibrium (1, l~
risk rlvminales any othe.r equilibráum ojqP when tlzc nvisr, P is small.
Proof. Wo first show tha1. (I,I) risk dominatcs any ol.hr~r pnrc Na.vh c,qnilibrium of qr~
whcn ~l'~ is srnall. IL suffiecs to show that ( I,I) risk dominates (2,l). Wc first cornputc,
the biceutric prior that is used in the risk dominance c:ornparison. Let us first compute
thc prior pF- of player F. If F plays z.l ~( 1 - z).2 then the best response of L is
} If Z 1 n2,(71r ~ u2)
bi(z) - 2 if z G 71z~(71z t u2)
hcnce, the prior of F is given by'l3
ttr~(tt~ f ut) if i- I ~~
PF(2) -
7L~,(ul ~ 7!2) If 2- 2
(5.i'3)
Nc;xt we computc the prior of player L. If L plays z.l ~(1 -z).2, then thc best response
of l~' depends on the message that F receives and on the siae of the noise. However,
since the posLerior of F puts positive weight only on the actions 1 and 2 of player l,,
F will respond with either 1 or 2 at each possible message. Furthermore, if the noise is
small, then F will respond Lo Lhe message i- 1(resp. i- 2) with the action 1(resp. 2)
for most, values of z. Hence,without doing any cornpuLations, we may sLate Lhat player
L's prior P~' rorresponds to a behavioral strategy Jo of player h' that is of Lhe following
funn:
~1 if i-1 andk-l
.(oA- .~1 if i-`l andk-2
0 if i~{1,2} and k~{1,`l}
(jk is the probability thaL F responds to signal i with action k.) Now, let the prior
00 -(PF~~PL) -(PF~.Ío) be as in (5.8), (5.9) and let thc game gP~`~oa be as in (4.1), (4.2).
If t is sufficiently small, thcn the unique equilibriurn (sv~`, fP~`) oí this game is the best
reply against Lhe prior, hence
1 if i-1 andk-l
E',r -
J,k 1 if i-2 andk-2
0 if i~{1,2} and k~{1,2}
and, provided that ~P~ is suí~iciently small,
(5.10)
sP'~(i) - 1 if i- l. (5.11)Hcnce, in particular, player I, chooses the Stackelberg strategy with probability 1 for
tirna,ll l. We clairn t.hat., if wo ntove along the distinguished curve in I'r'(o") by increasing
t, thcn playcr h' has to switch his strategy before player L docs. 'í'hc argument is
simply t,hat, ií F does not switch from a strategy as in (5.10), then l, is facing a convex
combination of strategies of type (5.9) and (5.10), hence, this is just, a strategy of type
(~i.9), a.gaiust which the sl.rategY Crom (5.11) is the unique best rcwpouse. Ilence, as I
incn~a.ticw, playcr l."s postcrior bclicfs puL tnorc and rnorc wcighL on 1, playing "I" and
gradually h' switches to respond with "1" at more and rnore messages. Such cttanges in
behavior of h' however, do not necessitate a change in behavior oC L: 'I'he strategy from
(.5.1 I) romains a best response. Consequent.ly, if no equilibriurn is rPached yet, F will
havc Lu c.hn.ngc again. l;ventually (when l gets closc to 1), h"s postcrior aftcr the messagc
"`l" will put. so tnur:h weighl, on !, playing "1" thaL 1~' will respond I,o that, message by
playing "I" as wel1. At that point in tirne wc havc obtainr~d the equilibriutn (1,1) from
gv and no further adjustments are necessary. Hence, starting at the prior (5.8) -(5.9),
the tracing procedure converges to (1, 1), so that (1,1) risk dominates (`2,2). Hence, the
Stackelberg equilibrium risk dorninatcs any purc equilibrium of gt'.
Next., let s' be a mixed strategy equilibrium of gP. Proposition `L implies that, if the
noise is small, there exists an action i E Z such that player L plays i with a probability
very dose to one. [f i- I, then (1,1) is the unique equilibrium of gr~c~"o {or all t. IC
i~ I, t.hen the proof follows exactly the same line as above: Player l, plays "1" for each
vahtc uf l and playcr !'' switchcs several tirnes until he (inally responds to all messages
by playing "1„ o
Our final result is
Proposition 7. lf g is 2 x 2 game and ~P~ is small, then gP izas one equilibriunz
thal risk rlaminales all othcr eyuilibria and the oulcome genernted G~ lhis risk dominanl
equilibriurn converqes to the Slackelberg outcome (l,br) as ~P~ -r 0.25
Proof. 'I'hc resulL Collows frorn Proposition 3 in case player l~' has .r dorninant s1.raLegy
in y (yE" has only one equilibrium in this case). Hence, assume LhaL I"' does not have
a dorninanL sLraLcgy. WiLhout. loss of gencrality atisurnc br - 1 and 6y - 2. In casc y
docs not, havc any pure equilibria, Lhc resulL again follows from ProposiLion 3 since g~'
has a uniyua equilibriurn in Lhis case. (The uniquc best, respouse of I"' against strategy
i of playcr l, is to respond with i to any message, but then Cs best response is to play
J~ z.) 'I'hc,rc arc thrcc cascs Icft to considcr.
(i) (I,I) is thc uniyue purc cyuilibrium of g.
(ii) (2,2) is Lhc uniyuc puro cyuilibrium of g.
(iii) bot.h ( I,I ) a.nd (`l,'l) ri.rc pure equilibria in g.
'I'hc~ (irst r~asc is casy: IL can bc resolved by iLcraLivc clirninaLion of tiLric~l.ly dorninaLc~d
sI raLegic~s. ( II, shorild bc obvious [rorn thc dcscript.ion of risk dominancc on Lhe preceding
pages that, st,raLegics thaL are iLeratively st,ricl,ly dorninated cannol, in(luence the risk
dominance relationship.) '1'he strategy "21n of player F(play k~ i in response to i for
i- 1,2) is sLricLly dominaLed and once this sLrategy has been eliminated, the strat,egy
1 becornes stricl,ly dominanL for player l,. (Note thaL action 1 is dominaul, for !, in g
in c~aso (i).) 'I'hc third casc~ is vcry much likc Lhc casc considcrrd in Proposil,ion 6 and
Lhc prouf proccx~ds along t.hc samc lines. Wc Icavc I,hc dctails to Lhc rcadcr. In casc (ii),
q~' has three equilibria, viz. a rnixed equilibriurn with outcome close to (1,1), a mixed
cquilihriiun wit,h ontc.omc rlose to (2,'2), and Lhc~ pnrc~ c~quilihrium ('l,`L). We have t.o
show I,hat t,he first. oquilibrium risk dominaLes the IaLter Lwo. 'I'hc proof follows from
Lemrn~r 'l. Namcly, consider t.he bicent,ric prior p~ of player l, in game gr relevant for the~
comparison between the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium and the pure equilibrium (2,`l).
Thc rcader casily verifies that
~pl~In~pl.(b) - 1~ (5.12)
sina~ Lhe til.rategy G of playcr l~' (with b; - i all i is a br~t responsc Lo Lhe noisy Stack-
elbcrg r~quilibriurn and is "alrnosL" a besL responsc t,o thc purc cquilibriurn. Ilcncc, iL2fi
follows from Lcrnrna 2 that the noisy SLackclhcrg c~ctuilibriurn risk dorninatcs the purc,
Nash cynilibriurn. 'fo show that this equilibrium also risk dorninat.cs t.hc third mixcd
rqnilihriuni, wr nutc t.hal. Lhc sl.ratc~gy G of playcr h' is Lhc uniqnc bc~xl. mspousc againtil.
a xl rirl runvc~x c urnbinal.iuu uf Lhc~ t.wu ntixcd c~qnilihriurn sl,raLc~gics uf playrr 1, in qr~.
Ilcncc~, in I,his casc thc prior tiatisfics pi,(1 `L) - I ancl thc conclusion again follows front
Lenrma 2. o
Although we conjecture that the result frorn Lhe I'ropositions 6 and 7 can be gener-
alizcd to other classes of games, we have to adntit that we have not. bccn able to fincl
a general prooL (We do noL have a counterexarnple eil.her.) Ilowever, we note that.
applying the tracing procedure can be rather cornplex, so that a nmlLilal,eral procedure
as t.haL in Section 4- in which the tracing procedure is applied only once might bc
preferable to a thcory in which one is forced to rnake a rather large number of bilateral
comparisons. I:urtherrnorr., in ordcr to apply the Ilarsanyi~Selten thcory one has to first.
computc~ all (prirnit.ive) equilibria of t.he game. We were able to provc Propositon 4
withcrut. knowing this set, of all cyuilibria.
6 Conclusion
I~rum t,hc~ fac t thal, any purc Nash cyuilihritun of a'L-pc~rson sirnultancuus ntovc gatnc,
is also a pure Nash eyuilibrium outcome of the sequential rnove garne in which Lhe
follower can only observe irnperfectly the action Lo which the leader cornmitted hirnself
(Yroposition 1 in this paper), Kyle E3agwcll concludecl in his 1992 paper that slight noise
clintinatcs any firsL mover advantages. In the concluding secaion of his paper, I3agwell
writcs
"t~irr appliecl thcx~rists, the kcy rnessage of the paper is that, Lhc ntarry prc-
clict.ions clcrived from modcls wit.h commítrncnt. rnay rcquirc rccontiidcrat.ion.
Apparc~nLly t.hcsc prcdictions arc valicl unly for settings in which Lhc conr
mittcd action is iu faca perJectly observc~d by subsequent playcrs. '('his re-
quircrnent is quite stringent, and it would seern to be violatcd in a number`l7
o( n,al-world sct.t,ings I,o which popular conmiil,rnenl, mudcls a.rc~ thuught Lo
apply" ( 13agwcll ( 1992, p. 9) emphasis in original).
Whilc wc agrex~ with t.hc obacrvation that Lhc assumption of pcrfcct obscrvability iti
stringent., we eíisagree with the statement thaL Lhis assumption is cruciaL In fact, we
woiild c la.im I,bat, this papc,r shows Lhat, thc assrunpl,ion is inesscnt,ial. Nol, only havc wc
shuwn I liat t.hc, nuisy ganic analyzcd by Hagwcll has always an cx{uilibriunr outcomc Llial,
is c lusc~ to Lhc suhgarnc pcrfcc:L cquilihriurn of Lhc garnc in which thc connnitment can bo
ubsarvcd pcrfectly (Proposit,ion 3), we havc also givcn scveral argumcnts for why playcrs
should coordinatc on this particular equilibriurn (Propositions 4, f and 7). [n addition,
wc have rernarked that the structure of the noisc as assumed by liagwell is somewhat
peculiar and that. other speci(ications, which are, perhaps, more natural and which are
cluscr to Schclling's original idcas (Schelling (I9fi0, p. Ih9)) also allow thc conclusion
that, t.hc assurnption of perfecl, obscrvability is inrssentiaL Flence, wc do not sce any ncx.d
to rrconsider the fundarnental game theoretic. insighL thaL the power to comrnit onesclf
rnay bc bcnc(icial.
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Endnotes
I. 13agwell (1992) resLrict,s himself Lo the case whr.re player h' has a uniyue besL re~-
sponse to any pure actiuu i of player L. He writes that the basic re~ults are rnost.
cxsily reported in this case, from which Lhe reader rnight bc Lernptcd to concluda
that his result (Proposition 1 in our paper) is also valid for garnes that do not





'I'he unique pure eyuilibrium of the game g of Figure A1 is (B, E), however,
('I',WF,) is also a pnre Nash equilibrilnn of g~ and this equilibrium results in
the outcome (T, W). 'I'he reader rnighL ohjcct LhaL Lhe IatLcr equilibriwn is nol.
credible since it is nut perfect (although it certainly is sequent.ial). 'fhia deficiency
is casily climinated by adding a third (dorninated) strategy of playcr 1, Lo the garne
ar;xinst. whirh W is Lh(~ uniqnc bcst, respunsc of playcr I''.
1. We (ould equivalent.ly work wiLh bchavioral s1.raLcgies, cL also (5.9).
:i. 1~1)r a trrouf of Lhc kirsl. slaLcmenl., scc Van Uarnlnc (19ti7, 'I'hnl l.(i2). 'I'hc sc('.ond
statelncul. follows fronl t.hc obscrval.iun t.hal, in g(~ncric gam(w, a. puro st.raLefiY t,ha.1.
iti a bcsl. response is a uniyue besL rf~spouse againsl, an open acL of sLraLegics in t.hc
nl.ighb(rrhood. S(Y~ Kalkenborg (1992) for furt.h(,r dct.ails about. Lh(~ proo(.Discussion Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
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